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TAXATION OF TRANSFERS INTENDED TO TAKE
EFFECT IN POSSESSION OR ENJOYMENT
AT GRANTOR'S DEATH
By HENRY ROTTSCHAEFER*
T HE inheritance tax statutes of most of the states imposing
taxes of that character include among the taxable transfers
those intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after the transferor's death." The federal estate tax act, which
levies the tax on the transfer of a decedent's net estate, includes
in the gross estate property to the extent of any interest therein
of which the decedent has, during his lifetime, made a transfer
or created a trust intended to take effect in possession or en-
joyment at or after the death of the transferor or settlor.2 The
inclusion of such transfers among those taxed by the states is
of long standing, and was in its inception and still is motivated
largely by the desire to close one of the avenues for tax avoid-
ance. These provisions of state and federal statutes have
occasioned an immense amount of litigation; the discussion that
follows will consider the judicial treatment accorded the more
important problems that have arisen in construing and applying
them.
THE PROBLEM UNDER STATE INHERITANcE TAx AcTs
The discussion of the constitutional problems that have been
raised in connection with taxes imposed by these provisions will
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
3Although there are slight variations in the language of the various
statutes, their substance is sufficiently indicated by the language in the
text. For collections of the statutes, see Otis and Gleason, Inheri-
tance Taxation, or Pinkerton & Millsapps, Inheritance and Estate
Taxes.
2See the Estate Tax Titles of the various Revenue Acts; for that
presently in force see the Revenue Act of 1926, somewhat amended on
other points by the Revenue Act of 1928.
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be deferred until the scope of the taxes imposed thereby has
been considered. State inheritance taxes levied on transfers of
this character are clearly imposed not on successions to inter-
ests in property that occur as an incident to the disposition of
the estates of decedents, but rather on successions to such inter-
ests that have their legal source in a transfer of property from
one living person to another living person. It is too well estab-
lished to require the citation of authorities that these provisions
of state inheritance tax statutes do not tax the succession of
a vendee to the vendor's interest by an absolute sale, or of a
donee to a donor's interest by an absolute and completed gift.
The problem, therefore, is to determine what characteristics a
transfer inter vivos must possess in order that the succession
resulting therefrom be taxable under these provisions of those
statutes. A literal reading of the language of these provisions
would seem to make the intention of the transferor the decisive
factor. The reasoning of the courts in dealing with these ques-
tions of taxability, however, is more often directed toward ascer-
taining the character of the interest created by the transfer than
to the intention of the transferor. This fact is not, of course,
inconsistent with the theory that those courts treat the trans-
feror's intention as the decisive factor, since they may well
accept the results achieved as the best and almost conclusive
evidence of the transferor's intention in making the transfer.
It does, however, suggest that the problem of taxability under
these provisions of state inheritance tax statutes be framed as
that of defining the type of interest that a transfer inter vivos
must create in the transferee if his succession thereto under such
transfer is to be taxable thereunder.
The discovery of the essential characteristics that an inter-
est created by these transfers must possess if succession thereto
under such transfers is to be taxable requires a consideration of
the fact situations in which the courts have drawn the legal infer-
ence of taxability and of the reasons that have supported their
inferences. The interest may be either legal or equitable. Courts
do not decide the question of taxability by analyzing the nature
of the interest acquired by the trustee, although an occasional
opinion quite erroneously (except where that factor affects the
question of the completed character of the gift) refers to that
factor in determining whether the transferor has divested him-
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self of title and possession.3 The statutory language suggests
that the real test of taxability is the time when the interest takes
effect in possession or enjoyment, and that, if that occurs at or
after the death of the transferor, succession to the interest is
taxable. Two questions, therefore, arise: (1) What is meant
by taking effect in possession or enjoyment; and (2) when may
that be said to occur at or after the transferor's death. The
answer to the former rests ultimately on a theory of property that
emphasizes certain of its aspects that have received but little
explicit recognition in other connections; the answer to the latter
may likewise involve some departures from property concepts
developed for other purposes. The consideration of these matters
is best deferred until the decisions have been analyzed.
A. CONSIDERATION AS AFFECTING TAXABILITY4
The language of these provisions of many of the state inheri-
tance tax statutes is sufficiently broad and general to include
transfers based on a consideration even where that is both valu-
able and adequate. The first question that arises is whether
transfers for a consideration are taxable where the statute is
silent on tlie question. Although it was stated, but not decided,
in one case that they would be and that the fact of considera-
tion was important only on the question of whether the transfer
was to evade the tax,5 the prevailing and correct view is that
these provisions apply to donative transfers only.0 The question,
therefore, arises what type of consideration is necessary to make
such a transfer non-donative. A transfer under an antenuptial
agreement under which the intended wife surrendered her dower
rights has been held non-taxable because based on a valuable
consideration,7 but.the contrary has also been decided in a case
in which the opinion failed to touch on this question.5 A trans-
3See, for example, People v. Northern Tr. Co., (1928) 330 I1.
238, 161 N. E. 525.4See on this subject notes on Consideration as affecting liability
to a succession or inheritance tax, 7 A. L. R. 1046, 58 A. L. R. 1143.5Brown v. Gulliford, (1917) 181 Iowa 897, 165 N. V. 182.
6Hagerty v. State, (1897) 55 Oh. St. 613, 45 N. E. 1046. In re
Orvis' Estate, (1918) 223 N. Y. 1, 119 N. E. 88; People v. Porter,
(1919) 287 Ill. 401, 123 N. E. 59.
-In re Baker's Estate, (1903) 83 App. Div. 530, 82 N. Y. S. 390,
aff'd (1904) 178 N. Y. 575, 70 N. E. 1094; In re Schinall's Estate, (1920)
191 App. Div. 435, 181 N. Y. S. 542, aff'd (1920) 230 N. Y. 559, 130
N. E. 893.
sEstate of Oppenheimer, (1925) 75 Mont. 186, 243 Pac. 589. See
notes, Antenuptial contract as transfer intended, etc., 44 A. L. R. 1475,
49 A. L. R. 895.
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fer made in consideration of the grantee's giving up his pro-
fession at the grantor's request in order to devote himself to the
latter's business has been held non-taxable because based onl a
valid and adequate consideration." The consideration must be
more than formal,a and, therefore, in It Re Orris Eslatc. ° an
agreement between partners under which the survivor was to
take the amount remaining in a capital fund, established under
the agreement from contributions by both partners, was held to
effect a donative and taxable transfer. This case may be taken
to overrule several earlier New York cases one of which in-
volved substantially similar facts,1' and another of which involved
the creation of a joint tenancy in property formerly held by the
joint tenants as tenants in common." The principles governing
this problem have never received a better formulation than in the
Orvis Case above cited, in which the court said:
"In all cases in which the value of the consideration for the
property transferred, under the statutory conditions, is so dispro-
portionately less than the value of the property transferred that
the transfer is, in the light of reason and of ordinary intelligence
and judgment, beneficent and donative, the transfer is taxable.
• . . If, in truth, it in effect bestows, under the statutory condi-
tions, a bounty or a benefaction, and is not a transfer for money's
worth, it is taxable."
It seems, however, that it is not sufficient that the grantee
has rendered services to the grantor unless these services were
intended as, and understood to be, consideration for the transfer
rather than gratuitous." It has been stated that the consideration
must move from the beneficiary to the grantor,'1 4 but it has been
decided that a transfer under an antenuptial contract to the chil-
9In re Cole's Estate, (1922) 202 App. Div. 546, 195 N. Y. S. 541.
aff'd on this point, (1923) 235 N. Y. 48, 148 N. E. 733. For another
case in which adequate and valuable consideration was found see In re
Robert's Estate, (1926) 128 Misc. Rep. 258, 219 N. Y. S. 311.9aSee late case on this matter, In re Wheeler's Estate (Neb. 1930)
228 N. W. 861.
10(1918) 223 N. Y. 1, 119 N. E. 88.
"In re Borden's Estate, (1916) 95 Misc. Rep. 443, 159 N. Y. S. 346.
1'In re Heiser's Estate, (1913) 85 Misc. Rep. 271, 147 N. Y. S.
557; see also In re De Escoriaza's Estate, (1914) 87 Misc. Rep. 215.
149 N. Y. S. 796, in which the mere recital that the creation of a joint
tenancy was for $1 and other good and valuable consideration was
held to exempt the transfer from a tax in absence of evidence by state
to prove it donative.
"People v. Porter, (1919) 287 Ill. 401, 123 N. E. 59; see also
People v. Tavenner, (1921) 300 Il. 373, 133 N. E. 211.
14In re Stephan's Estate, (1923) 121 Misc. Rep. 596; 201 N. Y. S.
461; this case, however, involved a statute expressly mentioning con-
sideration but silent on the matter for which it is here referred to.
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dren of the marriage was non-taxable, though one intended, etc..
because based on a good, valid and valuable consideration which
in fact moved from the intended wife to the intended husband.,
it may, therefore, be taken as established that, where the statute
is silent on the matter, donative transfers only are taxable, and
that a transfer is non-donative only where based on an adequate
and valuable consideration moving from the grantee to the grantor
with some exceptions as to this last matter.
Some statutes that have express provisions on the matter
merely give statutory expression to the principles above developed.
Such was the California statute involved in Estate of Brix" in
which the sole question was as to the adequacy of a consideration
that was admittedly a valuable one. It was held that, although it
might seem inadequate as measured in wholly pecuniary terms,
the matter was not entirely susceptible of that type of icas-
urement, and that, therefore, the judgment of the parties was
entitled to great weight. A mere surrender of potential interests
is not deemed a valuable and adequate consideration under such
a statute.:" A transfer is taxable though based on a valuable
consideration if the value of the transfer greatly exceeds the
value of the consideration where the statute exempts only a "bona
fide purchase for full consideration in money or money's worth.",
The effect of the absence of the requisite consideration tinder
these statutes and those that are silent on the matter is to tax
the transfer at its full value. Some statutes, however, tax it
only on the excess of that value over the value of the consideration
received by the grantor.'9 It has been held under such a statute
that the consideration must move from the beneficiary."
14ln re Schmall's Estate, (1920) 191 App. Div. 435, 181 N. Y. S.
542, aff'd (1920) 230 N. Y. 559, 130 N. E. 893. See, accord, Estate of
Brix, (1919) 181 Cal. 667, 186 Pac. 135, in which the consideration
moved from the mother while the transfer was to the children.
I6Estate of Brix, (1919) 181 Cal. 667, 186 Pac. 135.
'
7Estate of furphy, (1920) 182 Cal. 740, 190 Pac. 46. For other
California cases on this matter, see Estate of Reynolds, (1915) 169
Cal 600, 147 Pac. 268. Abstract & T. Guar. Co. v. State, (1916) 173
Cal. 691, 161 Pac. 264; Estate of Felton, (1917) 176 Cal. 663, 169
Pac. 392.
'
8 State Street Tr. Co. v. Treas. & Rec. Gen., (1911) 209 Mass.
373, 95 N. E. 851.
'9See, e. g., N. Y. Laws, 1922, ch. 430, sec. 4. For cases discussing
this provision see Matter of Fieux, (1925) 241 N. Y. 277, 149 N. E.
857; In re Stephan's Estate, (1923) 121 Misc. Rep. 596, 201 N. Y. S.
461. 201n re Stephan's Estate, (1923) 121 Misc. Rep. 596, 201 N. Y. S.
461.
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B. WHAT TRANSFERS ARE TAXABLE 2 1
The successions taxable under the provisions taxing transfers
intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
the transferor's death are taxable whether they result from direct
transfers or transfers in trust. It may be well to dispose at
the outset of the question whether the vested or contingent char-
acter of the interest acquired under such transfers has any bear-
ing on the taxability of the succession thereto. A transfer may
create an interest that is at the time of its creation either vested
or contingent in right or title. An interest vested in title at
such time may be either vested in possession and enjoyment at
such time or be a mere vested right to future possession and
enjoyment. It might in either case be absolutely vested, or vested
subject to being divested by the exercise of a reserved power
so to do. It seems preferable to place the situations in which
a grantor has reserved powers of revocation or control in this
category rather than to treat them as if the grantees, who will
frequently be to some extent in actual possession and enjoyment
of the property, had an interest that was contingent in title. An
interest strictly contingent in title at the time of its creation must
necessarily be one whose possession and enjoyment is both future
and contingent. The discussion of the instant question will be
aided by setting forth the types of situation that raise the problem
in its various forms. The classification is made solely with ref-
erence to the situations created by the transferring instrument
or instruments where several of them are for some reason treated
as a single instrument; it takes no account of the factor of the
modification of the situations created by an instrument made by
subsequent independent deeds or contracts, since that raises prob-
lems meriting separate treatment.
Five principal types arise as follows: (1) where the transfer
creates an interest vested both in title and in possession or
enjoyment at the time of its creation; (2) where it creates an
interest vested in title at the time of its creation but which is
to vest in possession or enjoyment only at or after the transferor's
death; (3) where it creates an interest contingent in title at the
time of its creation but which may under the terms of the deed
vest both in title and in possession and enjoyment prior to the
2 t See on this general subject the note, Taxation of transfers in-
tended, etc., (1926) 35 Yale L. J. 601; note, When transfer deemed to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death, 49 A. L. R. 864.
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transferor's death; (4) where it creates an interest contingent
in title at the time of its creation but which under the terms of
the instrument may vest in title prior to, but in possession or
enjoyment only at or after, the transferor's death; and (5) where
it creates an interest contingent in title at the time of its creation
and which must remain such up to or after the transferor's death.
The third and fourth cases envisage the possibility that the vest-
ing may never occur prior to the transferor's death, but they
bear on the immediate problem only where such vesting does in
fact occur prior to such death. The effect of the vested or con-
tingent character of the interest upon the taxability of the suc-
cession thereto can be investigated by considering these various
cases.
The succession under a transfer to an interest that is from
the time of its creation absolutely vested both ill right and
in possession and enjoyment is not taxable. If property is trans-
ferred to a trustee to pay the income to someone other than the
settlor for the cestui's life, the cestui's acquisition of that interest
is not a taxable, succession,2 and the result is not affected by
the fact that the income is to be accumulated for the cestui's
benefit during stipulated periods. 3  The non-taxability of the
acquisition by the cestui of his interest under a trust directing
the immediate payment to him of the income has been supported
on the theory that the beneficial interest vested in him at the
time of the delivery of the deed, that he was in possession and
enjoyment from that date, and that such possession and enjoy-
ment were in no way dependent on the settlor's death."' The
fact that the settlor himself retained no beneficial interest after
said date is also stressed."5  The same general principles prevent
the taxation of such a succession to a right to receive the income
until the beneficiary attains a specified age, 2 and the succession
under a completed gift of the income or principal or both on
terms that make it subject to be divested on the happening of a
specified contingency.2 7 A fortiori is the acquisition of the inter-
2 21n re Dunlap's Estate, (1923) 205 App. Div. 128, 199 N. Y. S.
147. 23People v. Northern Trust Co. (1927) 324 Ill. 625, 155 N. E. 768;
In re Kirby's Estate, (1928) 133 Misc. Rep. 152, 231 N. Y. S. 408.24Dexter v. Treas. & Rec. Gen., (1923) 243 Mass. 523, 137 N. E. 877.2 Dexter v. Treas. & Rec. Gen. (1923) 243 Mass. 523, 137 N. E.
877; Dolan's Estate, (1924) 279 Pa. St. 582, 124 Atl. 1176.
2 6In re Kountze's Estate, (1923) 120 Misc. Rep. 289, 198 N. Y.
S. 442.
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est non-taxable when resulting from a completed gift under which
the donee at once goes into possession and secures the full use
of the donated property ;28 the same result has been reached even
where the donee permitted the donor to enjoy some part or all
of the beneficial uses of the property and to retain or share in its
control and management.29  The establishment of an irrevocable
trust by the deposit of money in a savings bank is deemced a
completed gift so that the cestui's interest is held not to be ac-
quired by a transfer making its acquisition taxable,30 but the
contrary result is reached where the settlor retains the benefits
and practical control during his life as when the trust is revoc-
able."' The holding that the interest acquired by the survivor
on the death of the other tenant of a joint bank account with
right of survivorship established by the deceased cotenant is not
one acquired by a transfer intended to take effect in possession
or enjoyment at death has been supported on the theory that the
surviving tenant acquired at the creation of the joint account all
immediate right of possession and enjoyment of the whole.32 The
factors most stressed in cases involving situations of the type
considered in this paragraph are that the transferee has at once
the actual possession and enjoyment of the property or a right
to its immediate possession and enjoyment, and that the trans-
feror has himself retained no such beneficial interest for the
period during which, under the transfer, the transferee has it.
It is immaterial in such cases, as will appear later, that the trans-
feror may have retained other rights or powers such as that of
disposing by will of any remainder interest that may have remained
undisposed of by the instrument of transfer; that may affect
27Tn re Ferris' Estate, (1923) 94 N. J. Eq. 726, 121 Atd. 692; In re
Masury's Estate, (1898) 28 App. Div. 580, 51 N. Y. S. 331, afl'd, (18())
159 N. Y. 532, 53 N. E. 1127.
2SIn re Thorne's Estate, (1899) 44 App. Div. 8, 60 N. Y. S. 419.
291n re Hendrick's Estate, (1914) 163 App. Div. 413, 148 N. Y. S.
511, aff'd (1915) 214 N. Y. 663, 108 N. E. 1095; In re Edgerton's Estate,
(1898) 35 App. Div. 125, 54 N. Y. S. 700, aff'd (1899) 158 N. Y. 671.
52 N. E. 1124; In re Bullard's Estate, (1902) 76 App. Div. 207. 78
N. Y. S. 491; Kelley v. Woolsey, (1918) 177 Cal. 325; cf. People v.
Shaffer, (1920) 291 Ill. 142, 125 N. E. 887.
30 In re Rudolph (1915) 92 Misc. Rep. 347, 156 N. Y. S. 825; Mat-
ter of Reed, (1915) 89 Misc. Rep. 632, 154 N. Y. S. 247; In re Brennan,
(1915) 92 Misc. Rep. 423, 157 N. Y. S. 141.
"aIn re Barbey's Estate (Surr. Ct. 1908) 114 N. Y. S. 725. In re
Halligan's Estate, (1913) 82 Misc. Rep. 30, 143 N. Y. S. 676. It should
be said that the courts are not always agreed as to what facts estab-
lish the retention of use and control by the settlor.
-'Estate of Gurnsey, (1918) 177 Cal. 211, 170 Pac. 402.
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the taxability of successions to those remainders, but not that
of succession to the interests immediately vested in possession
and enjoyment. It may therefore be stated that in general where
an interest created by a transfer in a person other than the trans-
feror is vested both in interest and in possession and enjoyment
at the time of its creation, its acquisition involves no taxable
succession under those provisions of state inheritance tax stat-
utes that tax transfers intended to take effect in possession or
enjoyment at or after the transferor's death. The only cases that
cannot be reconciled with this statement are those holding taxable
the acquisition of a life estate under a deed in which the trans-
feror has reserved a power of revocation or very extensive powers
of control over the property and the interest of the transferee
on the theory that the retention of such powers is inconsistent
with an intention to vest an absolute right to present and future
enjoyment in the transferee at the time of the deed." These could
be reconciled therewith if the interest of such life tenant be held
contingent in title as long as those powers are retained, but that
would involve using the conception of contingency in title in a
rather unusual sense.
A transfer may create an interest that is immediately vested
in title but the possession and enjoyment of which are deferred
till some future time. In such case the problem arises whether
the mere fact that it is vested in interest at the time of its creation
prevents its acquisition from being treated as a succession tax-
able under the provision of the statute as to transfers intended,
etc.34 The clearest case raising that issue is where the transferor
creates a vested remainder on a life estate reserved to himself.
The remainder interest is almost invariably deemed to have been
acquired by a transfer intended, etc., so as to render its acquisition
taxable.35 It is immaterial in such case that one or more of the
33Matter of Bostwick, (1899) 160 N. Y. 489, 55 N. E. 208; In re
Hoyt's Estate, (1914) 86 Misc. Rep. 696, 149 N. Y. S. 91. These cases
are limited by numerous other New York decisions.
-
4Hereafter the phrase "transfers intended etc." will be used
instead of the expanded expression contained in the statutes.35Matter of Green, (1897) 153 N. Y. 223, 47 N. E. 292; Matter of
Brandreth, (1902) 169 N. Y. 437, 62 N. E. 563; People v. Estate of
Moir, (1904) 207 Ill. 180, 69 N. E. 905; In re Wallace's Estate, (Or.
1929) 282 Pac. 760; Reish, Admir. v. Pennsylvania, (1884) 106 Pa. St.
521; In re Estate of Schuh, (1922) 66 'Mont. 50, 212 Pac. 516; Harber
v. Whelchel, (1923) 156 Ga. 601, 119 S. E. 695; In re Harvey's Estate,(N. J. Prerog. 1924) 129 Atl. 393, aff'd (1925) 128 Atl. 679, aff'd (1926)
102 N. J. L. 720, 136 AtI. 919, writ of error dismissed (1928) 278 U. S.
565, 49 Sup. Ct. 36, 73 L. Ed. 509.
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estates in remainder are themselves life estates. It has beeti
stated in one opinion that, if the right to possession and enjoy-
ment passed at the time of the execution of the deed. the transfer
would not involve a taxable succession, but this was in a case
in which the court construed the transfer as creating a right to
future enjoyment that was contingent up till the time of the
transferor's death.17  Furthermore courts occasionally bolster up
perfectly valid reasoning for holding that a given transfer in-
volves no taxable succession with the argument that the right to
future enjoyment was vested at the time the deed was executed. "
However, statements of this character leave untouched the con-
clusions derivable from the decisions above cited, and are more
than balanced by express statements in cases, in which the state-
ment was pertinent to the issue, that the vested character of the
right is immaterial if the right to immediate possession and en-
joyment is deferred till the grantor's death."9  The recently
developed tendency to test the taxability of such transfers by
reference to the factor of the shifting of the economic benefits
and burdens in the thing transferred is inconsistent with attach-
ing decisive importance to whether the interest is vested or con-
tingent in right at the time of its creation.40 It may, therefore,
be taken as established that acquiring an interest that is to vest
in possession and enjoyment at or after the transferor's death
is not prevented from coming within the class of taxable suc-
cessions under the transfers intended, etc., provisions merely
because the interest was vested in right at the time of its
creation. This does not mean that the fact that possession and
enjoyment are to commence at or after the transferor's death
alone makes the succession taxable, as certain cases later dis-
cussed will show. It should, moreover, be said that the vested or
contingent character at the time of its creation of a right to the
future possession and enjoyment of a thing is an important factor
in connection with the problems of the retroactivity of such
transfers, when they occur, and on what amount the tax shall
36People v. Northern Trust Co., (1928) 330 Ill. 238, 161 N. E. 525.
37People v. McCormick, (1927) 327 Ill. 547, 158 N. E. 861.
3$People v. Northern Trust Co., (1928) 330 I1. 238, 161 N. E. 525.
39In re Estate of Schuh, (1922) 66 Mont. 50, 212 Pac. 516.
40Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, (1927) 276 U. S. 260, 48 Sup. Ct. 225, 72
L. Ed. 565; Chase Nat'l Bk. v. United States, (1928) 278 U. S. 327, 49
Sup. Ct. 126, 73 L. Ed. 405; Reinecke v. Northern Tr. Co., (1928) 278
U. S. 339, 49 Sup. Ct. 123, 73 L. Ed. 410.
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be computed; these will be separately considered at a subsequent
point in the discussion.
The next situation to be considered is that in which the interest
acquired is contingent at the time of its creation but becomes
vested both in title and in possession and enjoyment prior to the
transferor's death. A case of this kind would arise if A trans-
ferred property to T in irust to pay the income to A until A's
death or until his first born son, unborn at the time of the deed,
attained twenty-one years of age, whichever event should first
happen, and thereafter to deliver the corpus to such first born
son; and if thdreafter his first born son, B, attained said age
before A's death. There is no doubt but that, had A died before
such son attained said age, B's acquisition of the corpus would
have been taxable since he entered into its possession and enjoy-
ment at A's death under a transfer that intended that very result.
The question is whether the result would be different because B
acquired a right to the corpus vested both in interest and in
possession prior to A's death under the alternative disposition in
the deed. No case exactly like this has been found. It has,
however, been said that the sequence of events is to be viewed in
the order of the actual rather than the possible.,1  It is also
frequently stated that the vesting in possession an, enjoyment
must, if the succession is to be taxable, depend upon the death
of the transferor. 2  Furthermore, if the fact that a transferor
has retained the whole beneficial interest up to the time of his
death is a reason for holding a transfer taxable, 2 the fact that
he has completely divested himself thereof prior to such time
should suffice to establish its non-taxability. The absence of an
intention to postpone making a gift till the donor's death,," and
that the beneficial interest passed in the grantor's lifetime,"2 have
been given as reasons for holding the transfers making such
dispositions non-taxable. All these considerations justify the con-
clusion that the succession of B in the case above stated would not
be taxable. The cases furnishing the nearest analogy are those in
which A, having created in B a vested remainder under a deed in
41Aatter of Schmidlapp, (1923) 236 N. Y. 278, 140 N. E. 697.42State St. Trust Co. v. Treas. & Rec. Gen., (1911) 209 Mass. 373.
95 N. E. 851; People v. McCormick, (1927) 327 Il1. 547, 158 N. E. 81;
In re Bell's Estate, (1911) 150 Iowa 725, 130 N. W. 798.43Smith v. State, (1919) 134 Md. 473, 107 Ati. 255.441n re Bower's Estate, (1921) 195 App. Div. 548, 186 N. Y. S.
912, affd (1921) 231 N. Y. 613, 132 N. E. 910.45Dexter v. Treas. & Rec. Gen., (1923) 243 Mass. 523, 137 N. E. 877.
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which A reserved a life estate, thereafter assigns his life estate
to B; the succession of B to the remainder on A's death is generally
held non-taxable." If acquiring possession and enjoyment prior
to the transferor's death under a right so to do prevents the suc-
cession to a remainder which, under the deed creating it, could
not vest in possession and enjoyment prior to such death, from
being taxable, there is every reason to hold that there would be no
taxable succession where the right vests and the possession and
enjoyment are acquired prior to a transferor's death in accordance
with the very terms of the original creation of the interest. It nia.
therefore, be taken as correct that if an interest vests both in title
and in possession and enjoyment prior to the transferor's death
in accordance with the very terms of the transfer, the succession
is non-taxable, even though at its creation the interest was con-
tingent in title and though there existed a possibility that the
succession might occur in such a way as to make it taxable.
The remaining situations can be rather briefly disposed of. If
a transfer created a contingent right to receive the principal of a
trust fund on the settlor's death which becomes vested in title
prior to said death, there is held to be a taxable succession because
the interest vested in possession and enjoyment only at the settlor's
death.4 7 This is exactly in line with the principles that make such
a succession taxable even where the right to such future possession
was vested in title at the time of its creation. There remains the
situation in which under the terms of the transfer the interest
created is contingent in title at the time of its creation and inuit
remain such up to or after the transferor's death. Since no one
would contend that such a condition would l)revent taxability, the
only question is whether its mere existence requires the succession
under such a transfer to be held taxable. Eliminating the cases
in which the grantee acquires a life estate, subject to extensive
powers of control and revocation and amendment reserved to the
grantor, as not properly belonging in the present category, no
situation comes to mind in which an interest could continue con-
tingent in title up to the time of, or after, the grantor's death unless,
it were also limited to take effect in possession or enjoyment only
at or after such death. The fact that the holder of such interest
46Lanib v. Morrow, (1908) 140 Iowa 89. 117 N. W. 1118; Brown
v. Gulliford, (1917) 181 Iowa 897, 165 N. W. 182; State v. Welch, (1926)
235 Mich. 555, 209 N. V. 930.
47In re Cruger, (1900) 54 App. Div. 405, 66 N. Y. S. 636, aff'd
(1901) 166 N. Y. 602, 59 N. E. 1121.
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is also in possession and enjoyment of the same property by virtue
of a right to receive its income for the settlor's life acquired
under the same deed of settlement should not obscure the fact
that, under the assumed facts, the remainder can vest in possession
and enjoyment only at the settlor's death. Although courts are
not in accord as to what facts establish the required contingency,
the general holding is that, if the right to possession and enjoyment
remains contingent in title until the grantor's or settlor's death,
the succession to that interest is taxable.48 In such cases that fact
constituted merely an additional reason for holding it taxable.
The preceding discussion has shown that, if a transfer creates
an interest which under the terms thereof vests both in title and
in possession or enjoyment prior to the transferor's death, its
acquisition is not a taxable succession, with the one possible
exception indicated; and that, if it creates an interest which under
the terms of the transfer can vest in possession and enjoyment only
at or after the transferror's death, its acquision generally consti-
tutes a taxable succession whether the interest was vested or
contingent in title at the time of its creation or of the transferor's
death. The next question is what fact situations have been held to
show the presence of those ultimate factors that result in taxability
or non-taxability. Such an analysis of the decisions is necessary
before any theory can be ventured as to what elements of property
are denoted by the concept "possession and enjoyment." The
cases are so numerous that the method of using important typical
situations will have to be employed. It will be convenient to begin
with one that occurs very frequently. One such is the case in which
the transferor creates a remainder limited on a life estate reserved
to himself, or in which he transfers the property in trust to pay the
income to himself for his life, with remainders over. The question
in such cases can, of course, relate only to the taxability of the
succession to the remainders. The succession is invariably held
taxable if the life estate is reserved, or the right to receive the
income is created, by the instrument creating the remainder ;"
4sCoolidge v. Comm'rs, etc., (Mass. 1929) 167 N. E. 757; In re
Dunlap's Estate, (1923) 205 App. Div. 128, 199 N. Y. S. 147; Lilly v.
State, (1928) 156 Md. 94, 143 At. 661; Carter v'. Bugbec (1919) 92
N. J. L. 390, 106 AtL 412; Wright's Appeal, (1861) 38 Pa. St. 507;
Boston Safe Dep. Co. v. Comm'rs, etc., (Mass. 1929) 166 N. E. 729.49Matter of Green, (1897) 153 N. Y. 223, 47 N. E. 292; In re Eger-
ton's Estate, (1918) 103 Misc. Rep. 471, 170 N. Y. S. 222; In re
Stephan's Estate, (1923) 121 Misc. Rep. 496, 201 N. Y. S. 461; Mac-
Clurkan v. Bugbee, (N. J. Sup. 1928) 143 Ati. 757; People v. McCor-
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and it is immaterial whether the remainder is limited or unlimited
in its duration 'although that would affect its value.50 It is on
this theory that a transfer to a widow on her husband's death
under an antenuptial agreement has been held taxable as one
intended, etc.5 It has even been held that where a donor of
stock reserved for his life the right to vote it, the acquisition by
the donee of that right constituted a taxable succession to that
right. 52 The fact that the remainderman has under the deed a
power to withdraw part or all of the corpus by making demand
therefor upon the trustee does not prevent taxing the succession
to the whole of the principal if that power is unexercised.5 3 If
the deed directs the trustee to pay part of the income from the
property to others and part to the settlor, the succession to the
remainder of that part of the capital required to produce the
income reserved to the settlor is taxable.54 Any provision requir-
ing a trustee to pay the income as directed by the settlor is
equivalent in this connection to a reservation of it to his own
use, 55 even though the deed also contains a term providing for
the distribution of the income during settlor's life to another.,"
In both the cases just cited the power to direct was exercised at
least in part, but, since there were in both other reasons for
holding the transfers taxable, it remains uncertain as to whether
the holdings would have been the same had it not been exercised at
all and the alternative dispositions of the income been followed.
If the grant of a remainder interest subject to a life interest in
the grantor for his own life is accomplished by several instruments
under circumstances showing an agreement or understanding to
that effect, the transaction is considered as a single one by reading
the instruments together, and held to effect a taxable succession
if it would have done so had the terms of the several instruments
been contained in one document. This method seems to be quite
mick, (1927) 327 Ill. 547, 158 N. E. 861; Harber v. Whelchel, (1923) 156
Ga. 601, 119 S. E. 695; In re Marshall's Estate, (Minn. 1930) 228 N. W.
920.
5OPeople v. Northern Trust Co., (1928) 330 I1. 238, 161 N. E. 525.
5'Estate of Oppenheimer, (1925) 75 Mont. 186, 243 Pac. 589. See
notes, Antenuptial contract as transfer intended, etc., 44 A. L. R. 1475.
49 A. L. R. 895.
521n re Ferris' Estate, (1923) 94 N. J. Eq. 726, 121 Atil. 692.
53 In re Flynn's Estate (1921) 117 Misc. Rep. 90, 190 N. Y. S. 905.
54People v. Kelley, (1905) 218 Ill. 509. 75 N. E. 1038.
55People v. McCormick, (1927) 327 Il. 547, 158 N. E. 861.56Matter of Bostwick, (1899) 38 App. Div. 223, 56 N. Y. S. 495,
aff'd (1899) 160 N. Y. 489, 55 N. E. 208. The trusts contained other
terms that alone would have sufficed to make them taxable.
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frequently employed. An absolute conveyance under an arrange-
ment by which the grantee at once leased the property to the
grantor for his life without rent or for a nominal rent effects a
taxable succession.57 A like result was reached where the lease
back was for a term of years shorter than the donor's life ex-
pectancy but longer than the probable duration of his life because
of his physical condition." In deciding the question of taxability
courts are more concerned with the substance of the results than
the devices used to produce them. If the substance is a remainder
in the transferee that he can enjoy only after the transferor's
death, and the enjoyment of the property or its fruits by the
transferor until his death, the succession to the remainder is tax-
able.59 A common device is for the transferee to execute a bond
or make some other form of contract that insures the transferor
the enjoyment of the property for his life; these transactions are
taxable even though the transferee has possession since the enjoy-
ment is postponed till the transferor's death and remains in him
till then.10
The act by which the person who acquires the remainder vests
in the transferor the beneficial interest for the latter's life is usually
done in fulfillment of an agreement or understanding so to do
entered into at or before the transfer and contemporaneously there-
with. The fact that it occurs later should not affect the result, but,
if it is a separate and distinct transaction, the creation of the
remainder is not deemed a taxable transfer since in that case
the whole title and interest in the property will have vested in
the transferee immediately upon the transfer to him."1 The facts
in some cases show a transferor to have retained practically
complete control and the full fruits of the property conveyed
until his death although there appears to have been no express
arrangement, contract or reconveyance to him made by the trans-
feree under which the transferor could be said to be enjoying
those benefits as a matter of right as against a claim that tile
transferee might assert. If the transfer is contingent in title the
-TIn re Dobson's Estate, (1911) 73 Misc. Rep. 170, 132 N. Y. S.
472. 581n re Russell's Estate, (N. J. Prerog. 1929) 146 Ad. 361.
59People v. Estate of Moir, (1904) 207 Ill. 180, 69 N. E. 905.
60 Matter of Brandreth, (1902) 169 N. Y. 437, 62 N. E. 563, 58 L.
R. A. 148; Matter of Cornell, (1902) 170 N. Y. 423, 63 N. E. 445; Reish,
Admr. v. Pennsylvania, (1884) 106 Pa. St. 521.
61Matter of Miller, (1902) 77 App. Div. 473, 78 N. Y. S. 930: In re
Willmarth's Estate, (1919) 106 Misc. Rep. 606, 174 N. Y. S. 885.
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case for taxability is clear for that very fact would give the
transferor the right as against the claims of such transferee to
continue to enjoy the property. But there are cases holding that,
even if the interest created in the transferee is vested, its acquisi-
tion is taxable under the fact situations above outlined. 2 In one
case, however, factual enjoyment during the transferor's life of
shares of stock transferred to another was held not to make
the transfer taxable because no contract had been shown, express
or implied, entered into at or before the transfer, from which
a trust for the transferor could be inferred.0 3  The requirement
that the transferor's continued enjoyment of the transferred
property during his life be based on some transaction that confers
it upon him as a right against the transferee seems technically
sound, but courts will have to be diligent in discovering or evoking
implied contracts in those situations if it is not to open an avenue
for tax evasion. No agreement or consent on the part of the
transferee is required where his interest arises under a deed
delivered in escrow to be delivered to him on the grantor's death,
and the grantee's acquisition of his remainder is taxable."'
Taxability cannot be avoided by resort to indirect methods if
their substantial effect is to reserve to the owner of the property
a life estate or right to its income for his life. Hence, where
A transferred securities to B who the next day transferred them
to T in trust to pay the income to A for his life, the court will
treat it as a direct transfer from A to T on such trusts, and the
succession to the remainders on A's death is taxable.& It has
even been held that an absolute gift of shares in a corporation
was taxable where the corporation had been organized to hold
the donor's real estate which he had transferred to it with a
reservation of a life estate, and where the donor withheld from
the donee the right to vote such stock during the donor's life.
The theory of the decision was that the reservation of a life estate
in the realty which prevented any dividends being earned on the
shares, since that realty comprised the corporations entire assets,
and the denial to the donee of the right to vote the shares, in
effect deferred the time when he would enter into possession and
62People v. Shaffer, (1920) 291 I1. 142, 125 N. E. 887; In re
Sharer's Estate, (1901) 36 Misc. Rep. 502, 73 N. Y. S. 1057.63In re Bullard's Estate, (1902) 76 App. Div. 207, 78 N. Y. S. 491.
64People v. Shutts, (1922) 305 Ill. 539, 137 N. E. 418.
65In re Miller's Estate, (1919) 109 Misc. Rep. 267, 178 N. Y. S.
554, reversed in (1923) 204 App. Div. 418, 198 N. Y. S. 202, which was
itself reversed in (1923) 236 N. Y. 290, 140 N. E. 701.
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enjoyment of the shares until the donor's death. 6 A dissenting
opinion rests on the technically correct theory that the reservation
of the life estate in the realty is immaterial since it was not that
which was given to the donee.
Among the devices frequently resorted to by grantors is an
outright transfer in exchange for an enforceable promise that
the grantee will confer upon the grantor for his life specified
economic benefits of the kind that could have been obtained
directly by retaining the property. If the grantee's promise is to
support the grantor for life with no obligation to apply thereto
the granted property or the income therefrom, the succession is
not taxable since it imposes no limitations on the grantee's use and
enjoyment and involves no reservation to the grantor of any
interest in the property. 7 The same reasons, among others, are
urged to support the conclusion that the transfer is not taxable
where the donee promises to pay the donor an annuity which,
however, is not required to be paid out of the income from the
property and is payable whether or not there be any such income.
even though the donated property is deposited with a trust com-
pany as security for the performance of the promise under an
arrangement giving it a power of sale. 8 At the other extreme is
the case in which the promise is the payment of an annuity to the
grantor for his life out of the income or, if necessary, the principal
of the transferred property; the succession under such a transfer
is taxable, since this effects a reservation to the grantor of its
use and enjoyment for life." The case does not indicate whether
the whole of the income was required to pay the annuity or not,
but there is no indication that that factor would have affected
the quantum of the principal whose transfer would have been held
taxable. The language in a New Jersey case and part of its
decision rather suggest that if the donor is to receive even a part
of the income from the transferred property the transfer of the
whole is taxable. 0 Charging the property with the whole of the
donor's existing and future liabilities has the same effect."1 But
between these two extremes lie those cases in which the grantee
681n re Wallace's Estate, (Or. 1929) 282 Pac. 760.6 7 1n re Thorne's Estate, (1899) 44 App. Div. 8, 60 N. Y. S. 419.68 1n re Edgerton's Estate, (1898) 35 App. Div. 125, 54 N. Y. S.
700, aff'd (1899) 158 N. Y. 671, 52 N. E. 1124.69In re Estate of Schuh, (1922) 66 Mont. 50, 212 Pac. 516.70 1n re Honeyman's Estate, (1925) 98 N. J. Eq. 638, 129 Atd. 393,
aff'd (1926) 103 N. J. L. 173, 131 Atl. 924, 134 Atl. 915.
7iDubois' Appeal, (1888) 121 Pa. St 368, 15 Ati. 641.
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promises to pay the grantor for his life interest on the transferred
capital value. This is generally held to make the transfer taxable
on the theory that it is equivalent to the grantor reserving a life
estate in the transferred property.12 It has been stated that if a
donor, even though immediate possession pass, is to receive
interest on the sum transferred, or a sum equal to the whole or
a part of the income from the transferred property, the transfer
is one in which the donor intends to postpone the donee's enjoy-
ment till the donor's death. 7' The actual decision of that case,
however, was that the transfer was not taxable where the donee's
promise was to pay the donor for his life a fixed sum which
was in fact equal to six per cent. on the sum transferred, since
the donee's enjoyment was not deferred till the donor's death.
That is technically correct, but it is arguable whether a mere
difference in the form of the promise by which the donee assumes
obligations, equivalent in amount and identical in their fixity.
should entail different tax results.
The question arises as to the effect upon the taxability of a
transfer in which the transferor reserves a life estate or a right
to receive the income for his life, of a sale or assignment of the
life estate to the person entitled after the transferor's death to
the remainder or the principal. The majority of the cases that
have passed on this problem have held that this has the effect of
making the transfer non-taxable, that is, of making the succession
to the remainder or principal on the transferor's death non-taxable
because not effected under a transfer intended to take effect in
possession at or after the transferor's death.14  The reasons
assigned are that the subsequent transaction modifies the original
transfer so that the transferee acquires a right to immediate
possession and enjoyment; that the transferee acquires nothing
by succession on the transferor's death because he entered into
posession and enjoyment before such death; and that, had the
original deed made the dispositions ultimately made of the income
72Todd's Estate, (1912) 237 Pa. St. 466, 85 Atl. 845; In re Iar-
vey's Estate, (N. J. Prerog. 1924) 129 Atd. 393, aff'd (1925) 128 Atd.
679, aff'd (1926) 102 N. J. L. 720, 135 Atl. 919, writ of error dismissed.
(1928) 278 U. S. 565, 49 Sup. Ct. 36, 73 L. Ed. 509; but see Wolff v.
Comptroller, etc., (1919) 90 N. J. Eq. 221, 105 Ati. 871.
73 In re Honeyman's Estate, (1925) 98 N. J. Eq. 638, 129 Atd. 393,
aff'd (1926) 103 N. J. L. 173, 131 Att. 924, 132 Atl. 915.
74Lamb v. Morrow, (1908) 140 Iowa 89, 117 N. W. 1118; Brown v.
Gulliford. (1917) 131 Iowa 897, 165 N. W. 182; State v. 'Welch's Estate,
(1926) 235 Mich. 555, 209 N. V. 930.
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by the assignment, there would have been no taxable transfer.
It is, of course, true that under these circumstances the person
entitled to the remainder or the principal after the transferor's
death under the original deed is in possession and enjoyment as of
right immediately after the sale or assignment to him of the
transferor's intervening life interest, and that, if the remainder
or right to the principal was vested in title, such person has in
fact the most important economic benefits of the property from
that time on. The life estate and remainder may both have been
legal estates or equitable interests, or one may have been a legal
and the other an equitable interest; but, irrespective of that factor
and of technical rules as to mergers of interests and as to the
cestui's power to require a termination of the trust, the above
decisions seem justified on the basis of the facts alluded to in
the preceding sentence. Neither those facts nor the reasons urged
in the cases last cited would apply where the remainder or right
to the principal on the transferor's death remained contingent in
title up to the time of such death, and hence in such case the
possession and enjoyment acquired under the assignment of the
intervening life interest do not prevent the succession to the
remainder under the original transfer from being taxable." This
decision is correct since the economic benefits acquired by the
assignment of the life estate were limited in their duration and
the possession and enjoyment after the transferor's death involved
the acquisition of a new economic benefit not theretofore belonging
to him who acquired it. The same result was reached in a case
in which the transferor at the time of releasing his life interest
reserved a power to recall the property at any time on demand,
for the reason, among others, that the retention of that power
prevented the property from passing from him, with all the
attributes of ownership, until his death.70 It should be stated
that the transferor was in fact permitted to receive the income
during his life even after his release thereof, and that that factor
is also relied on to sustain the result. The cases that treat the
acquisition by the remainderman of the intervening life interest of
the transferor as defeating the tax raise certain difficulties. If
the tax is on the act of going into possession and enjoyment and
dependent on that occurring at or after the transferor's death,
it is perfectly logical not to tax where that event occurs prior to
75 Coolidge v. Comm'rs, etc., (Mass. 1929) 167 N. E. 757.
'
6In re Fulham's Estate, (1923) 96 Vt. 308, 119 At. 443.
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such death. If, however, the tax is on the creation of the right,
that is, on the acquisition of an interest limited, by the transfer
that creates it, to commence in possession and enjoyment at or
after the transferor's death, then the act on which the tax is levied
occurs either at the time the deed or transfer takes effect or, if
creation of the right is taken to mean a vested right, at the time
the event occurs that makes it vested. A tax liability should arise
when those ultimate facts occur on which taxability depends even
though the duty to discharge that liability might be postponed till
a later date. If this be correct, it would follow that a deed that
at once created a vested remainder or a vested right to the principal
on the grantor's death would at once create the right whose creation
constitutes the tax subject. If this be so, the effect of treating
the assignment by the grantor of his reserved life interest to those
having a vested remainder or right to the principal on his death
as preventing taxability, is to extinguish a tax liability that had
already arisen. The same would be true in every case where
such remainder vested in title prior to the grantor's assignment
of his life interest to the remainderman. Expressions can be
found to support both of these theories as to the subject on which
the tax is imposed.-, No case has been found in which a grantor
has assigned his reserved life interest to the remainderman that
discusses this aspect of the problem. This is probably (lie to
the fact that the accrual of the duty to pay a tax at some time
and the coming into existence of the duty to discharge that lia-
bility by payment when the time for payment has arrived are
seldom distinguished either in the statutes or in the decisions.
A donor might conceivably make a transfer in which he
retained the right to the income from the property for a definite
period not in terms limited by his life. A case of that kind would
arise where he transferred land subject to a lease for such period
without at the same time transferring his right to receive the
rents under the lease. It is clear that the transfer would not be
taxable if he survived the termination of the lease. The question
is whether it would become so if he (lied prior thereto. This
is not a case of alternative limitations, one of which is such that,
if the succession occurs under it, it would be nontaxable. It is
rather a case in which facts convert a succession not in terms
77As to the former theory see Saltonstall v. Treas. & Rec. Gen.
(1926) 256 Mass. 519, 153 N. E. 4, aff'd sub. nonl. Saltonstall v. Salton-
stall, (1927) 276 U. S. 260, 48 Sup. Ct. 225, 72 L. Ed. 565; as to latter
see Matter of Schmidlapp, (1923) 236 N. Y. 278, 140 N. E. 697.
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dependent on the donor's death into one that occurs in possession
and enjoyment after such death. It has been held that there is in
such case no taxable transfer.s The reasons assigned were that
the donee had all the possession and enjoyment he could acquire
until the lease expired, and that his possession and enjoyment
were in no sense dependent on the donor's death. The latter of
these is both correct and adequate to justify the decision; the
former is not correct in any substantial sense, whatever be its
technical accuracy, for the donor could have given the donee the
right to the rents, that is, to the most significant economic element
of enjoyment.
It is patent that the reservation of a life interest that is in
fact enjoyed by the transferor until his death affords the clearest
case of the creation of an interest intended to commence in pos-
session and enjoyment at such death. The question arises whether
the transferor's retention of such an interest is a requirement
before there can be a transfer that creates in another an interest
intended to take effect in possession and enjoyment at the trans-
feror's death, or whether the retention of other interests or powers
where a life interest is not retained suffice to create interest-,
whose acquisition constitute taxable successions. The most impor-
tant problem of this type is where the transferor has reserved
a power to revoke the grant or terminate the trust." The simplest
case raising the question of the effect of the reservation of such
a power is that in which A transfers property to B, or creates
a trust to pay the income therefrom to B, for a term in no way
defined by reference to A's life. It is clear that B in such a Case
in fact possesses and enjoys the property, or enjoys its fruits,
for such term from the very moment the transfer is made and
does so under a right derived thereunder. The decisions are not
in accord as to whether the reservation of the power to revoke or
terminate makes the acquisition of that interest taxable. It has
been held that it was taxable because the holder of the interest
was prevented thereby from having that complete dominion over
the property which is the characteristic of absolute ownership,
7sin re Bell's Estate, (1911) 150 Iowa 725, 130 X. V. 798.
"9The discussion that follows is restricted to this problem so far
as it arises under the "Transfers intended, etc." provision of state inher-
itance tax statutes. Some of the statutes at present contain specific
provisions as to the effect of the reservation of a power to revoke, alter.
etc. Cases under them are not considered. See on this general prob-
lem E. S. Stimson, When Revocable Trusts are Subject to an Inher-
itance Tax, (1927) 25 Mich. L. Rev. 839.
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that it was not until the donor's death that the beneficiary became
irrevocably entitled to the income of the trust property whose
income he was to receive for his own life, and that the donor
had not surrendered complete dominion over the property. 0 Long
prior to that case, however, New York had definitely held in
In Re Masury's Estate"' that the mere reservation of a power to
revoke did not make the transfer taxable since the cestui, who
under the deed was to get the income during his minority and
thereafter the principal, had the full enjoyment of the income
during the settlor's life and that no change in his relation to the
trust was effected by said death. The Boshuick Case,82 however,
limited the Masury Case so closely that it was treated as having
overruled it. In that case the transfer of a life interest for the
cestui's life was held taxable where the deed of trust reserved
to the settlor a power to revoke and other powers of control,
since the reservation of those powers was held to be inconsistent
with a purpose of immediately vesting in the beneficiaries an
absolute right to the present and future enjoyment and precluded
the inference of an intention to have the transfers take effect in
possession and enjoyment before the settlor's death. The history
of the question in New York after the Bosthick Case shows a
gradual trend away from it back to the viewpoint of the Masury
Case, and finally it became as definitely established as such things
can be that the mere reservation of a power to revoke did not make
the transfer one intended to take effect in possession and enjoy-
ment at or after the transferor's death. 3 A clear statement of the
reasons to support the present rule is found in In re Cochrane8 '
which involved the taxability of the creation of a life interest for
the cestui's life under a deed in which the settlor reserved a power
to revoke. Emphasis was placed on the fact that the enjoyment,
construed to mean the use of, or income from, the property,
passed to the beneficiary at once, that no further beneficial interest
passed to him on the settlor's death, and that the gift was complete
1OIn re Hoyt's Estate, (1914) 86 Misc. Rep. 696, 149 N. Y. S. 91.81(1898) 28 App. Div. 580, 51 N. Y. S. 331, aff'd (1899) 159 N. Y.
532, 53 N. E. 1127.
82Matter of Bostwick, (1899) 160 N. Y. 489, 55 N. E. 208.831n re Miller's Estate, (1923) 204 App. Div. 418, 198 N. Y. S. 202,
aff'd (1923) 236 N. Y. 290, 140 N. E. 701; In re Carnegie's Islatc.
(1921) 117 Misc. Rep. 806, 191 N. Y. S. 753, aff'd (1922) 20 App. l)iv.
91, 196 N. Y. S. 502, aff'd (1923) 236 N. Y. 517, 142 N. E. 266.
84(1921) 117 Misc. Rep. 18, 190 N. Y. S. 895, appeal denied, (1922)
202 App. Div. 751, 807, 194 N. Y. S. 924.
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in possession and enjoyment until the reserved power was exer-
cised. The same result has been reached in other states in cases
involving the taxability of both the acquisition of life estates for
the transferee's life or other interests not measured by transferor's
life, and of remainders limited to commence on the expiration
of such interests8 5 In one case the reservation of the power to
revoke was held not to make taxable the transfer of either a life
estate for the transferor's life or of the remainder where both
were given to the same person, despite the fact that the remainder
took effect at the transferor's death.-6  Courts frequently frame
the issue in these cases as that of discovering the transferor's
purpose in inserting the reserved power to revoke, and finding
that purpose not to have been to postpone possession and enjoy-
ment until his death."' Other factors stressed have been that the
reservation did not affect the beneficiary's power of enjoyment,
nor prevent the passing of a complete interest to the trustee or
the creation of a valid trust ;8s all these reasons except the first
seem too formal to deserve any bearing on the tax question.
There have been several cases besides the New York cases
cited in the preceding paragraph in which the reservation of the
power to revoke or terminate has furnished either the sole or one
of the principal reasons for holding the transfer taxable. In one
case A had reserved a life right to the dividends from stock trans-
ferred to T in trust for that purpose, with remainder to T. Before
his death he released said right to T, but in fact continued to
receive the dividends till his death. By the instrument of release
he reserved the power to recall any of the shares on his demand.
This factor constituted practically the whole reason for holding the
transfer taxable, since because of it A had failed to relinquish
SSPeople v. Northern Trust Co., (1919) 289 Ill. 475, 124 N. E. 662;
Dolan's Estate, (1924) 279 Pa. St. 582, 124 AUt. 1176; cf. Wright's Ap-
peal, (1861) 38 Pa. St. 507. See also as to non-taxability of the trans-
fer of the remainders limited to commence in possession on expiration
of such life or other estate, In re Bower's Estate, (1921) 195 App.
Div. 548, 186 N. Y. S. 912, aff'd (1921) 231 N. Y. 613, 132 N. E. 910;
In re Kountze's Estate, (1923) 120 Misc. Rep. 289, 198 N. Y. S. 442.
8 6In re Schweinert's Estate, (1929) 133 Misc. Rep. 762, 234 N. Y.
S. 307.8 7People v. Northern Trust Co., (1919) 289 Ill. 475, 124 N. E. 662;
In re Masury's Estate, (1898) 28 App. Div. 580, 51 N. Y. S. 331, aff'd
(1899) 159 N. Y. 532, 53 N. E. 1127; In re Carnegie's Estate, (1921)
117 Misc. Rep. 806, 191 N. Y. S. 753, aff'd (1922) 203 App. Div. 91.
196 N. Y. S. 502, aff'd (1923) 236 N. Y. 517, 142 N. E. 266; In re
Cochrane's Estate, (1921) -117 Misc. Rep. 18, 190 N. Y. S. 895, appeal
denied, (1922) 202 App. Div. 751, 807, 194 N. Y. S. 924.
8 8Dolan's Estate, (1924) 279 Pa. St. 582, 124 Atl. 1176.
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all power of control and to confer upon T the right to dispose of
the property and use its avails. To escape the tax a transfer must
pass the property from the donor with all the attributes of owner-
ship independently of his death."' The succession taxed in this
case included the acquisition of the remainder. In another case
A had transferred property to T in trust to pay the income to B
for a limited period, renewable by A at the end of any period for
another like period; the principal to be paid to B within sixty days
after the termination of the period during which A died. The
transfer of the principal to B was held taxable because her interest
therein was contingent until A's death since it depended upon A
dying without revoking.90 A later Massachusetts case involved a
trust creating immediate life interests, for the cestuis' lives, with
remainders over not in any manner conditioned by reference to the
settlor's death; the settlor had reserved a power to alter the trust
in any way that would not revest in him any beneficial interest in
either the income or principal. The transfer was held non-taxable
because the beneficial interest vested in the cestuis at once, they
were in possession and enjoyment from the delivery of the trust
deed, and that possession and enjoyment were not contingent on
the settlor's death.9 1 It was also stated that the settlor reserved
no beneficial interest, and that the mere existence unexercised of
a power to divest the donees did not deprive them of their interest
or make it contingent on the settlor's death. It is true that this
would not deprive them of their interest; but it is equally clear that
it would make their continued enjoyment contingent up to the
time of the settlor's death in a factual although not in a technical
legal sense, and that that contingency is in no way affected by the
fact that the reservation was not for the settlor's benefit, although
it might well be contended that it was for his benefit in so far as he
effectually retained the important power to dispose of the property.
A rather recent Massachusetts case involved the taxability of the
successions to remainders created by a trust deed by which the
settlor created an immediate life interest for the cestui's life in
another than himself or the remaindermen, and in which the settlor
reserved the right to alter or terminate the trust with the consent
of others than the remaindermen whose successions were being
89In re Fulham's Estate, (1923) 96 Vt. 308, 119 Atl. 443.90New Eng. Trust Co. v. Abbott, (1910) 205 Mass. 279, 91 N. E.
379. 9XDexter v. Treas. & Rec. Gen., (1923) 243 Mass. 523, 137 N. E.
877.
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taxed. The court held the successions taxable since the interest
of these remaindermen remained contingent until the settlor's death
because of certain provisions in the deed, including the provision
as to the power to alter or terminate. 2 It is true that in this
case their interests were thus contingent in a technical sense as
well as in fact because of the other provisions relied on and that
these alone would have justified the result. The case is, there-
fore, only inferentially authority for the proposition that the mere
reservation of a power to alter or terminate creates a contingency
affecting the interests created by a transfer until the transferor's
death, and that such contingency makes the transfer taxable as
one intended to take effect in possession and enjoyment at such
death. In so far as it points in that direction it seems in conflict
with the last preceding case cited unless the manifestly untenable
position be taken that the contingency disappears merely because
the power reserved caniot be exercised to revest the property in
the settlor but only to divest the interests created and transfer them
to others. In both cases the transfers created in others than the
settlor an interest immediately possessed and enjoyed by its owner
as of right, with remainders limited to commence in possession on
the termination of the first interest, and a factual contingency
affecting them all. Whether the question is of any practical impor-
tance in Massachusetts since the Saltonstall Case" depends upon
its implications and the inferences that can be drawn from some
of the arguments advanced in the opinion therein both by the
Massachusetts court and the Supreme Court of the United States.
It can at least be said that the cases discussed in this paragraph.
and some of the New York decisions referred to in the preceding
one, give those states that have not yet decided the matter a
respectable foundation on which to predicate the taxability of the
acquisition of interests by transfers in which the transferor has
reserved a power to alter, revoke or terminate.
The cases that have been reviewed in considering the effect
upon the taxability of a succession of the fact that the transferor
has reserved a power to alter, revoke or terminate have all, with
the possible exception of In re Fulhain's Estate"' involved situa-
92Boston Safe Dep. & Trust Co. v. Com'rs, etc., (Mass. 1929)
166 N. E. 729.
93Saltonstall v. Treas. & Rec. Gen., (1926) 256 Mass. 519, 153 N.
E. 4, aff'd Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, (1927) 276 U. S. 260, 48 Sup. Ct.
225, 72 L. Ed. 565.
94(1923) 96 Vt. 308, 119 Atl. 443.
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tions in which there was an immediate creation in another than the
transferor of a right to presently enjoy the use of or income
from the transferred property. The question in some of them
was as to the taxability of the transfer of that interest itself. It
is difficult to see how on any theory as to what constitutes taking
effect in possession and enjoyment at or after the transferor's
death the mere reservation of a power to revoke can have that
effect where the interest created is for the life of the transferor,
since that death puts an end to the period of enjoyment and it
would be absurd to treat the prior enjoyment as taking effect
at the moment it in fact ceases. The case is not as easy where
the interest created may tinder its terms and does in fact endure
beyond the transferor's death. The power to revoke cannot be
exercised after such death, and, therefore, that death gives the
interest an unconditional character that it did not have before
even though it may have been vested in the technical sense. The
owner of the interest is now assured of its enjoyment for the
specified period. He is also in fact in a better position than before
to capitalize that series of future enjoyments by a sale. It is not
wholly unreasonable to interpret these facts as involving the
acquisition of new economic benefits that shifted to him at that
time. But this applies only to that part of the series originally
transferred that will materialize after the transferor's death. The
few decisions in which the transfer of such interests have been
held taxable where a power to revoke was reserved do not show
whether the tax was computed on the value at the time of the
transferor's death of the future units in the series or of the whole
series originally transferred. It is difficult to see on what theory
the uses in fact enjoyed prior to the transferor's death can be
considered as having taken effect at such death; the economic
benefits from them certainly did not shift to the owner of the
interest at that time. The cases declining to tax the acquisition of
such an interest merely because subject to a reserved power to
revoke seem clearly sounder than the few that tax it. Even levying
the tax on that part of the series that comes after the transferor's
death seems questionable so far as the tax is deemed on the creation
of the right, unless that right be split into one to enjoy up to the
date of death unless revoked and one to enjoy thereafter; it is more
readily defensible so far as treated as levied on the act of actually
acquiring something in possession and enjoyment at the trans-
feror's death. The question of the effect of a reserved power to
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revoke has, however, also been considered as it affected the
taxability of the transfer of a remainder limited to commence
in actual possession and enjoyment at the termination of an
interest presently vested in enjoyment in another than the trans-
fdror or the remainderman for a period not measured by reference
to the transferor's life. If the remainder should actually com-
mence in possession and enjoyment prior to the transferor's death,
the case would be practically the same as one in which the enjoy-
ment commenced at once on the transfer, and the considerations
above set forth would apply. Hence the test case is where actual
possession is in fact deferred until or after the transferor's death.
Such a transfer of a remainder would not be taxable if no power
to revoke had been reserved.95 The reservation of such a power
does in fact make the remainderman's interest contingent until the
transferor's death, however much it may be vested in the technical
sense. He, therefore, acquires at such death definite economic
benefits which may be said to shift to him at that time. That
benefit is the absolute right to a series of future enjoyments com-
mencing either at the very instant of the transferor's death (in
the possible case in which the prior interest in possession chances
to end at that very moment) or in the future, and its absolute
character in fact makes that worth more than was his prior con-
tingent interest. Prior to such death he had neither the actual
present enjoyment nor an absolute right to the future series; after
it and because of it he has the latter but not the former for even
in the possible case above mentioned he does not acquire immediate
enjoyment because of such death. It is recognized that he would
acquire such absolute right only at such time even where his actual
enjoyment has commenced prior thereto, and that logic might
require treating at least continued enjoyment of the series after
such time as taking effect at that time on one of the theories
above suggested in the case of interests presently vested in
enjoyment subject to a power to revoke. The decisions give no
answer to this question. There are, therefore, very cogent
reasons for treating the mere reservation of a power to revoke
as making the transfer of a remainder taxable where that does
not in fact commence in possession and enjoyment before the
contingency to which it is subject is removed by the transferor's
death. The majority of cases that have passed on it, however,
do not so hold. It should be stated that the preceding discussion
95People v. Northern Trust Co., (1927) 324 I11. 625, 155 N. E. 768.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
of this point has assumed that there were no other provisions
in the deed of transfer making the right to the remainder con-
tingent either in fact or in a technical sense.
The question of the effect upon the taxability of a succession
of the retention of powers other than that of revoking or ternii-
nating, or of interests other than a life estate or right to the
income for the transferor's life, must next be considered. A
transfer in which the donor reserved extensive powers of con-
trol and management over the property during his life has been
held taxable since that prevented that parting with title, posses-
sion and enjoyment during his life which is essential to non-
taxability. 6 The same factor has been relied on along with
others to reach the same result,"7 and that effect has been im-
pliedly admitted even where the actual decision was against
taxability."' Reserving a power to remove the trustee and super-
vise his investments during the settlor's life,"' and providing
that no part of the property should be sold during the settlor's
life without his consent,"9 9 have been held insufficient to make the
transfer taxable. The reasons assigned were that these did not
prevent the enjoyment by those immediately entitled thereto, nor
the complete divestment by the settlor of his ownership. Reserving
a power to alter or amend has usually been accompanied by a
power to revoke, and seems to be accorded the same treatment
as the latter when it is unqualified.' 9 ' It has, however, been held
that a power to amend did not make a transfer taxable where
limited so that it could not be exercised so as to revest in the
settlor any beneficial interest in the property, on the theory that
he reserved no beneficial interest and that the mere existence of a
power unexercised to divest the donees of their interest did not
deprive them of those interests or make them contingent on the
settlor's death.'9 2 If a donor reserves and exercises a power, created
9(State & City Bk. & Tr. Co. v. Doughton, (1924) 188 N. C. 762,
125 S. E. 621.97 Mvatter of Bostwick, (1899) 160 N. Y. 489, 55 N. E. 208; 'eople
v. Shaffer, (1920) 291 Ill. 142, 125 N. E. 887.9811n re Cochrane's Estate, (1921) 117 Misc. Rep. 18, 190 N. Y. S.
895. Appeal denied, (1922) 202 App. Div. 807, 194 N. Y. S. 924.
99Dolan's Estate, (1924) 279 Pa. St. 582, 124 Atd. 1176.
1°°0n re Cochrane's Estate, (1921) 117 Misc. Rep. 18, 190 N. Y. S.
895, appeal denied, (1922) 202 App. Div. 807, 194 N. Y. S. 924.
"See In re Bower's Estate, (1921) 195 App. Div. 548, 186 N. Y.
S. 912, aff'd (1921) 231 N. Y. 613, 132 N. E. 910 in which court treated
a power to alter or amend as including the power to revoke.02Dexter v. Treas. & Rec. Gen., (1923) 243 Mass. 523,, 137 N.
E. 877.
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by the deed, to appoint by will a remainder, the succession thereto
has been held taxable both where that remainder was limited to
take effect in possession and enjoyment at the donor's death,""
and where limited so to commence on another's death who
in fact died after the donor although under an alternative
disposition it would have so commenced at his death."'
Both cases involved transfers that created interests in others that
were immediately possessed and enjoyed by them; in the former
no disposition of the remainder was provided for, while in the
latter there was an alternative disposition thereof in the deed, but
it does not appear whether or not it was appointed to the same
persons who would have taken in default thereof. There is
nothing in the opinions indicating whether any of these factors
had any effect on, or were considered in making, the decisions.
Whether the mere existence of such a power unexercised would
make the succession to the remainder taxable raises substantially
the same problems that were discussed when considering the effect
of an unexercised reserved power to revoke, and need not be again
discussed. Whatever be the effect given to such a reservation, it
cannot be avoided by indirection as by a donative transfer to
another followed by a re-transfer on terms giving the transferee,
who was originally the owner, this power to dispose of the remain-
der; in such case the transfer is treated as that of the original
owner.10 5 A question likely to arise in cases where the issue of
taxability turns on the degree of control retained is whether
factual control is sufficient to make the transfer taxable or
whether that control must belong to the donor as of right. The
cases have usually involved situations in which the donor had a
right to such control by express agreement or understanding, and
even in the case where no such express agreement was found the
court based its decision on what the parties intended.0 0 It has been
stated that it is the source and not the extent of the control that is
important in a case in which the transfer was held nontaxable
where there was in fact control under a subsequent agreement.""°
It may be said in conclusion that, where the reservation of control
renders taxable a transfer of a life estate for the donee's life
103Appeal of Seibert, (1885) 110 Pa. St. 329, 1 At. 346.
1O4Lilly v. State, (1928) 156 Md. 94, 143 Atd. 661.
305Lilly v. State, (1928) 156 Md. 94, 143 Atd. 661.
'
0 0People v. Shaffer, (1920) 291 Ill. 142, 125 N. E. 887.
'
071n re Hendrick's Estate, (1914) 163 App. Div. 413, 148 N. Y. S.
511, aff'd (1915) 214 N. Y. 663, 108 N. E. 1095; cf. In re Sharer's
Estate, (1901) 36 Misc. Rep. 502, 73 N. Y. S. 1057.
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commencing immediately, the same problems arise as to whether
the thing taxed is the whole interest or only that whose enjoyment
occurs after the donor's death, as were considered in discussing
the effect of reserving a power to revoke in a deed creating such
a life interest.
A donor may dispose of property on such terms that there
remains a possibility of its reverting to him. The question arises
whether the mere existence of this possibility makes a transfer
taxable. It usually does, and probably always must, arise as to
interests limited as remainders on an interest that immediately
vests in possession and enjoyment. If the latter interest is a life
interest reserved to the donor for his own life the succession to the
remainders is clearly taxable apart from any question of the effect
upon its taxability of the existence of a possibility of reverter.
Nevertheless the existence of that possibility was relied on to sup-
port the taxability of a succession to a remainder under those facts.
That possibility arose in that case because the trust was limited
to expire on an event that might, but in fact did not, occur during
the donor's life.08 The same factor was relied on to support a
tax on the succession to a remainder where the possibility of re-
verter arose solely because a condition might arise making inef-
fectual every one of the dispositions made by the deed, even though
the remainder was limited to the person who had a present life
interest for the donor's life.1°0 An earlier New York case, how-
ever, denied that the mere possibility of reverter arising from the
contingency that all the remaindermen might die before the donor
made taxable the transfer of a remainder limited on a present life
estate for the donee's life where said donee was a person other
than the donor or the remainderman."0 There have been several
cases in which the deed expressly provided for a reverter if
the donee of an immediate life estate for the donee's life pre-
deceased the donor, with an alternative disposition of the re-
mainder if the donor predeceased the donee. This was among the
factors relied upon to support the taxation of the succession to the
remainder under the alternative disposition on the theory that
the right of the remainderman did not become absolute until
the donor's death and that there was not until then a completed gift
108 People v. McCormick, (1927) 327 Ill. 547, 158 N. E. 861.
209In re Dunlap's Estate, (1923) 205 App. Div. 128, 199 N. Y. S. 147.
ilOIn re Bower's Estate, (1921) 195 App. Div. 548, 186 N. Y. S.
912, aff'd, without opinion, (1921) 231 N. Y. 613, 132 N. E. 910.
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of that remainder. 1 A later New York case reached an opposite
result in a substantially similar case on the theory that the posses-
sion and enjoyment of the remainder did not depend on or accrue at
the donor's death.1 2 An even later case refused to tax a succession
to a remainder limited on a life estate for the donor's life to the very
person who was the remainderman merely because the property was
to have reverted to the donor if the donee predeceased him.1'1
Among the reasons urged was that the donor retained no right of
ownership, or dominion over the property. An early Pennsylvania
case, however, relied to some extent upon the fact that the deed
provided for a reverter to the donor if the donee predeceased him
in holding taxable a transfer that was clearly so on other grounds."I
It is clear the effect of the existence of a possibility of reverter
upon taxability is far from settled. It seems rather extreme to
tax on this account where the possibility of reverter is due solely
to the factor that all those, in whose favor the dispositions have
been made, may die before the donor. The coming into posses-
sion and enjoyment of the remainders is in such cas6 in no sense
dependent on the donor's death except where he has retained a
life estate for his own life or created a present life estate in an-
other for the donor's life or where by other terms the remainder
is to commence in enjoyment at his death; and in the case of those
exceptions there is no need to rely upon this factor of the pos-
sibility of reverter. It is almost as extreme where that possibility
is due solely to the factor that the trust may expire before the
donor's death for practically the same reasons and subject to the
same exceptions as above mentioned and to the further exception
where the term of the trust is fixed by the donor's life. Here again
it is not necessary to invoke the possibility of reverter in order to
sustain a tax. There is, however, one difference between the two
cases. The latter lends itself more readily to creating a situation
in which the probability that the reverter will occur can be en-
hanced, but the likelihood that it will be thus employed involves
assumptions as to what such donors intend that are seldom true
to fact. There remain, therefore, the cases in which express pro-
vision is made for reverter upon the termination of a present
"'-In re Schermerhorn's Estate, (Surr. Ct. 1913) 149 N. Y. S. 95.112 n re Wing's Estate, (Surr. Ct. 1921) 190 N. Y. S. 908; see also
In re Kirby's Estate, (1928) 133 Misc. Rep. 152, 231 N. Y. S. 408.
"'13In re Schweinert's Estate, (1929) 133 Misc. Rep. 762, 234 N.
Y. S. 307.
U4Dubois' Appeal, (1888) 121 Pa. St. 368, 15 Atl. 641.
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interest in enjoyment for a term not defined by references to the
donor's life, conferred upon another than the donor, with an
alternative disposition of the remainders if the donor predeceases
the donee of such present interest. The right of the remainder-
man can never in such a case be anything but conditional as long
as the donor lives. Whether that involves the conclusion that he
can never enter into possession and enjoyment of the property
until at or after such death depends on what is meant by pos-
session and enjoyment. There is no doubt but that on the donor's
death before the owner of the present interest in enjoyment dies,
the remainderman's interest increases in value and that some econo-
mic benefits shift to him at that time and because of such death,
nor can it be denied that those benefits could not have come to him
prior to such death. There exist, therefore, good reasons for taxing
the succession to such remainders, but the true reason is not that
the deed created a possibility of reverter to the donor but that it was
only at the time of, and because of, the donor's death that there oc-
curred a fundamental change in the nature of the remainderman's
relations in respect of the property, and that that change could not,
under the deed of transfer, have occurred prior thereto.',
The preceding discussion leads naturally to the cases in which the
factor that a remainder interest continued contingent or condition-
al until the donor's death weighed heavily in holding the suc-
cession thereto taxable. The provision most frequently considered
in this connection is that which makes the right to succeed depend
on the remainderman surviving the donor. This was held to make
the transfer taxable in one case because such a transfer could
take effect "neither in right nor in possession" until the donor's
death; the decision, however, could have been, and to some ex-
tent was, based on other grounds11 The same factor was relied
on in another case to reach a like result even where the settlor
had assigned his reserved life interest to the remaindermen be-
fore his death, for the reason that it vested in the sons who stir-
vived the settlor "in interest, possession and enjoyment" only by
reason of and upon the settlor's death."'7 In another case it had
been argued that there had been a completed gift of the re-
mainder at the time the deed of trust was delivered. The terms
of the deed were such that the remainderman could take only
1115See Boston Safe Dep. & Tr. Co. v. Comm'rs. etc., (Mass, 1929)
166 N. E. 729, in which is found reasoning of this character.
116Wright's Appeal, (1861) 38 Pa. St. 507.
117Coolidge v. Comn'rs, etc., (Mass. 1929) 167 N. E. 757.
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if he survived not only the donor but also the holder of the im-
mediate interest in possession. It was primarily in answer to this
contention that the court described the interest that passed to the
remainderman at the time of the delivery of the trust deed as "a
possibility of a right which could not ripen into anything more
than a contingency" until, among other things, the settlor had
died.11 The theory in the above cases seems to have been that
the remainderman's interest continued contingent in right until
the donor's death. The cases in which a donor has created
an immediate interest in possession in another with provision
for a reverter if the holder of that interest predeceased the
donor and for alternative dispositions of the remainder if the
donor die first, have already been considered in discussing the
effect upon the taxability of the succession to such alternative
remainders of the retention of such a possibility of reverter.
It need only be added that such remainders in fact remain con-
ditional until the donor's death, whatever the technical char-
acter thereof under such a disposition of property, and that,
for reasons already indicated, good reasons exist for taxing the
succession thereto. The decisions in this type of case are, how-
ever, in sharp conflict,119 although the New York cases cited as
upholding taxability can be, and were, supported on other
grounds also.
The question whether a transfer taxable as one intended to
take effect in possession and enjoyment at or after the trans-
feror's death occurs upon the death of a joint tenant or a tenant
by the entirety bears a very close resemblance, so far as the
significant economic factors are concerned, to those in which
a remainderman is to take only if he survives the donor.'
This question has been most frequently treated by the New York
courts, although there have been a few decisions in other juris-
""Boston Safe Dep. & Tr. Co. v. Comm'rs, etc., (Mass. 1929) 166
N. E. 729.
119Holding the succession taxable, In re Schermerhorn's Estate.
(Surr. Ct. 1913) 149 N. Y. S. 95; In re Garcia's Estate, (1918) 183 App.
Div. 712, 170 N. Y. S. 980, aff'd, (1920) 192 App. Div. 902, 182 N. Y.
S. 925; Boston Safe Dep. & Tr. Co. v. Comm'rs, etc., (Mass. 1929)
166 N. E. 729.- Holding the succession non-taxable, In re Wing's
Estate, (Surr. Ct. 1921) 190 N. Y. S. 908; In re Schweinert's Estate,
(1929) 133 Misc. Rep. 762, 234 N. Y. S. 307.
"
0
-The cases discussed in the text do not include those under
statutes that expressly include such transfers. See on this general
problem, note, Survivorship agreement, personal property passing
under, as subject to succession tax, 3 A. L. R. 1642; note, joint tenan-
cies and survivorship agreements, 58 A. L. R. 1146.
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dictions. In discussing the cases a transfer of personalty to
two or more persons with right of survivorship will be treated
as creating a joint estate therein, since that accords with the
treatment of such situation by the courts. Three quite distinct
situations may arise. A, an owner of property, may transfer
it to himself and B as joint tenants without any consideration
whatever. There is in such case no denying that B acquires
an interest from A at the time the tenancy is created, and that
such interest includes the right of survivorship. It was, there-
fore, held that, where an owner of stock caused to be issued
a new certificate made out to himself and his wife, and the
survivor of them, a taxable succession to the wife for the full
value of the shares occurred at his death.1 21  The later New
York decisions, in which the essential facts were similar, held
there was no taxable succession for any amount, and these cases,
as was the first cited, were affirmed by the court of appeals
but without opinion. 122" These later decisions are in line with
the result finally reached by New York as to the non-taxability
of the survivor's succession to joint bank accounts. -1 2 3  All the
cases above referred to involved personal property. Prior to
the time when the New York court of appeals had affirmed deci-
sions holding non-taxable survivorship in the case of joint ten-
ants of personalty and joint bank accounts, it had by a divided
court held taxable the interest, acquired by a wife on her hus-
band's decease, in property that he had conveyed to himself
and her, but one judge only of the majority had treated the
transfer as creating a tenancy by the entireties or at least a joint
estate. The minority treated the transfer as creating an estate
by entireties, and took the position that the wife acquired nothing
by the husband's death since by the deed she had acquired the
title to the whole.12 4  It is certain that a lower court correctly
12'In re W. B. Dana Co., (1914) 164 App. Div. 45, 149 N. Y. S.
417, aff'd (1915) 214 N. Y. 710, 108 N. E. 1112.
122In re Thompson's Estate, (1915) 167 App. Div. 356, 153 N. Y. S.
164, aff'd (1916) 217 N. Y. 609, 111 N. E. 1101; In re Dalsimer's Estate,
(1915) 167 App. Div. 365, 153 N. Y. S. 58, aff'd (1916) 217 N. Y. 608,
111 N. E. 1085.
"23In re Thompson's Estate, (1915) 167 App. Div. 356, 153 N. Y.
S. 164, aff'd (1916) 217 N. Y. 609, 111 N. E. 1101; for New York cases
contra see In re Von Bernuth's Estate, (Surr. Ct. 1913) 143 N. Y. S.
672; In re Reed's Estate, (1915) 89 Misc. Rep. 632, 154 N. Y. S. 247;
In re Durfee's Estate, (1913) 79 Misc. Rep. 655, 140 N. Y. S. 594; In
re Kline's Estate, (1909) 65 Misc. Rep. 446, 121 N. Y. S. 1090.
1241n re Klatzl's Estate, (1915) 216 N. Y. 83, 110 N. E. 181.
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interpreted the effects of the court of appeals' later decisions in
holding that no taxable succession accrued to the surviving joint
tenant of realty upon the other joint tenant's death.'2-  The
decisions on this type of case in other jurisdictions accord with
those finally arrived at in New York,1-20 except that the impli-
cations of a New Jersey case later noted dearly indicate a
contrary rule.127 The second type of case is that in which A
and B transfer their separate. property to each other as joint
tenants. The succession of the survivor in such a case was held
non-taxable because nothing passed from the decedent to the
survivor on the former's death. 28 A New Jersey case is contra;
the reason assigned was that, though the grantor might tech-
nically have made an immediate transfer of his half interest to the
grantee, the "remainder" took effect in possession or enjoy-
ment only at his death.'29 It is certain that every state that
declined to tax the succession occurring by survivorship in cases
of the first type of case would decline to do so in the second
type of case."30 The third type of case arises where the joint
tenancy is created by the deed of a third party. It has been said,
but not decided, that the succession of the survivor would not
be taxable in such case because there is no transfer from the
deceased joint tenant, a reason that would make it immaterial
that the consideration for the transfer moved from the deceased
joint tenant.131 The Dana Case last cited also intimates clearly
that the succession would not be taxable if the donor joint
tenant predeceased the donee joint tenant. It may be taken as
1"'In re Horler's Estate, (1917) 180 App. Div. 608, 168 N. Y. S. 221.
1-6Estate of Gurnsey, (1918) 177 Cal. 211, 170 Pac. 402; McIntosh's
Estate, (1927) 289 Pa. St. 509, 137 Atl. 661; the latter case really
involved a situation of the second typie to be considered, but its impli-
cations support the rule of non-taxability in a case of the kind now
under discussion.
271n re Huggins' Estate, (1924) 96 N. J. Eq. 275, 125 Atd. 27, aff'd
(1925) 130 AtL 923, aff'd (1926) 103 N. J. L. 182, 134 At. 917.
-1SMclntosh's Estate, (1927) 289 Pa. St. 509, 137 Ati. 661. This
case has been treated as belonging to this type, although the joint
estate arose under a transfer from a stranger to whom each joint
tenant had first conveyed his or her separately owned realty.
_1
2 9 1n re Huggins' Estate, (1924) 96 N. J. Eq. 275, 125 Atd. 27, aff'd
(1925) 130 Atl. 923, aff'd (1926) 103 N. J. L. 182, 134 Atl. 917.
"
0
°Note, In re Heiser's Estate, (1913) 85 Misc. Rep. 271, 147 N. Y.
S. 557, holding such a succession non-taxable because the transfer was
based on a valuable consideration.
3'In re W. B. Dana Co., (1914) 164 App. Div. 45, 149 N. Y. S.
417, aff'd (1915) 214 N. Y. 710, 108 N. E. 1112; In re Huggins' Estate,
(1924) 96 N. J. Eq. 275, 125 Atl. 27, affd (1925) 130 Atl. 923, aff'e
(1926) 103 N. J. L. 182, 134 Atl. 917.
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certain that a state refusing to tax the survivor's succession in
the case of a joint tenancy would so refuse where the tenancy
was one by entireties; it is probable that a state taxing the former
would tax the latter because the former result is generally reached
by brushing aside all technical considerations drawn from the
common law incidents of such estates, and a court willing to do
that in the case of joint estates would probably be willing to
do so for estates by the entirety. It may be said in conclusion
that the cases holding these successions non-taxable have relied
wholly on technical considerations that should have had no place
in deciding the tax question; the cases contra have more often
had in mind, even when they have inadequately indicated it, the
practical effect upon the survivor's position of the other joint
tenant's death. It cannot be denied that such death enhances
the value of the survivor's interest in the property, and that this
involves a shifting to him of real economic benefits. It would,
however, be dangerous to predict how the courts of a state that had
not yet passed on these questions would decide them, but there
is reason to believe that the probability of decisions in favor of
taxability are greater today than before emphasis had been directed
to the factor of a shifting of economic benefits.
Among the reasons frequently assigned for holding a transfer
non-taxable is the fact that the transferor has by the transfer
divested himself completely of all interest in the property.'" Tihe
question arises whether this alone suffices to make the succession
to an interest under such a transfer non-taxable. The language
of the statutes suggests that it is not, for some of the disposi-
tions made may be limited to take effect in possession and enjoy-
ment at or after the grantor's death within a not unreasonable
interpretation of that expression. An examination of the cases
bears out the suggested conclusion. There have been several
cases in which a donor has transferred property in trust to pay
the income to another for the donor's life, remainder to the
cestuis for life if living at the donor's death, with alternative
remainders to others if the cestuis for life predeceased the
donor. It is clear that the donor has in such case completely
divested himself of all his interest unless the existence of a
132People v. Northern Trust Co., (1928) 330 I1. 238, 161 N. E.
525; Dexter v. Treas. & Rec. Gen., (1923) 243 Mass. 523, 137 N. E.
877. See for discussion of this problem, note, Are trusts where the
settlor reserves no interest in himself taxable under collateral inheri-
tance tax, (1926) 75 U of Pa. L. Rev. 168.
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possibility of reverter be deemed an interest retained. The succes-
sion to the remainder has been held taxable under these circum-
stances both where the alternative remainders took effect,113 and
where the remainders went to the life cestuis who survived the
donor.3  An argument that appeared in two of these cases was
that the possession and enjoyment of the remainders were not
intended to commence until the donor's death. The Massachusetts
case advanced the reason that to escape taxability the property with
all the attributes of ownership must pass independently of the
donor's death and the recipient acquire the unrestricted right to
.dispose of the property and to receive and use its proceeds, and
that in that case the principal was not to pass out of the donor
till his death. It is true that the principal was not to pass to the
remainderman with full powers of enjoyment till then, but that
was not due to the fact that the donor had retained those bene-
fits unless the existence of the possibility of reverter has that
effect. The court may have thought that it was essential to tax-
ability that an interest pass directly from the donor at his death,
but a later Massachusetts case expressly stated that this was not
necessary.135 The case is supportable on other grounds, but the
above reasoning seems quite inadequate. The Dunlap Case alone
of those cited makes the existence of a possibility of reverter a
factor in its decision. The Coolidge Case just cited may be taken
as also illustrating the principle that the succession to an interest
does not escape taxation merely because the transfer under which
it was created divested the donor of all his interest in the prop-
erty.136 The same can be said of those cases previously considered
in which an important reason for holding a succession taxable
was that the remainderman's interest was defined in terms such
that it could not materialize in possession and enjoyment until
at or after the donor's death. Where, however, a donor divests
himself of all interest in the property by creating interests in others
of such kinds that possession and enjoyment thereunder are not
contingent on the donor's death, the successions to such interests
1331n re Cruger, (1900) 54 App. Div. 405, 66 N. Y. S. 636, aff'd
(1901) 166 N. Y. 602, 59 N. E. 1121; but see In re Schweinert's Estate,
(1929) 133 Misc. Rep. 762, 234 N. Y. S. 307.
134State Street Trust Co. v. Treas. & Rec. Gen., (1911) 209 Mass.
373, 95 N. E. 851; In re Dunlap's Estate, (1923) 205 App. Div. 128, 199
N. Y. S. 147.
13 5 Coolidge v. Comm'rs, etc., (Mass. 1929) 167 N. E. 757.
1361t should be stated that this divestment in this case occurred
under the original deed and a subsequent assignment by the donur of
his reserved life estate.
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under such a transfer are non-taxable.1 37 Here, too, may be cited
the cases holding that the mere fact that the deed of transfer
provides for accumulating the income for fixed periods does not
make the transfer taxable,' even where one of the alternative
periods for accumulation was defined by the donor's death.13 The
reason most frequently given for holding taxable the succession
to an interest created by a transfer by which a donor disposes of
his whole interest in the property, is that the possession and enjoy-
ment of such interest can commence only at or after the donor's
death and by reason thereof. Other reasons are assigned in par-
ticular cases, but the above occurs with the greatest frequency.
But if the mere fact that a donor has divested himself of all
interest in the transferred property by the transfer, or by it and
other dispositive acts prior to his death, is not alone sufficient
to result in the non-taxability of the transfer, neither is the mere
fact that he has retained some interest up to the time of his death
under a deed intending that very result a sufficient basis for tax-
ability. It is necessary only to refer to the previous discussions
of the cases involving reserved powers of revocation and amend-
ment and joint estates and bank accounts. It is only where the
interest retained prevents the donee from possessing or enjoying
the property up to the time of or until after the donor's death,
and where the retention of the interest makes such possession
and enjoyment dependent on such death, that the retention of
such interest makes the transfer taxable. If it does that, it is
immaterial that these may also be postponed until the death of
another person. 4 0  Prior discussion has shown that there is no
unanimity as to when the reservation of interests by the donor
has the above mentioned effects. Whether taxing a succession to
an interest, created by a transfer by which the donor parts vith
his whole interest in the property, merely because sonic of such
interests may be limited to take effect in possession and enjoy-
ment at or after his death accords with the real purpose of these
taxing statutes or not, the decisions and reasoning in the first
137In re Kountze's Estate, (1923) 120 Misc. Rep. 289, 198 N. Y. S.
442; Dexter v. Treas. & Rec. Gen., (1923) 243 Mass. 523, 137 N. E.
877; People v. Northern Trust Co., (1927) 324 11. 625, 155 N. E. 768;
In re Marshall's Estate, (Minn. 1930) 228 N. W. 920.
"38People v. Northern Trust Co., (1927) 324 Ill. 625, 155 N. E. 768.
13OPeople v. Northern Trust Co., (1928) 330 Ill. 238, 161 N. F. 525.
l-Boston Safe Dep. & Tr. Co. v. Comm'rs, etc., (Mass. 1929) 166
N. E. 729.
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group of cases considered in this paragraph show that it is within
their letter.
There remain to be considered a few miscellaneous situations
in which the question of taxability has been considered. A trans-
fer in which the donor retains both a life interest for his own life
and a power of revocation is taxable. 14 1 The same is true where
he reserves such a life estate and a power to appoint by will "
or to demand part of the corpus.143  A transfer in which the
donor reserves a life estate for his life is not rendered non-tax-
able by the unexercised power in the remainderman to withdraw
any or all of the transferred property from the trustee, at least
where the trust deed provides that such withdrawal shall not
transfer any ownership in that withdrawn to such remainderman
until the donor's death. 44 The amount received by the bene-
ficiary under a life insurance policy on the insured's death is not
deemed taxable as received under a transfer intended, etc., merely
because it can be received by the beneficiary only on the insured's
death. Among the reasons assigned was the factor that the grant
of the right in the contract took effect in possession and enjoy-
ment at once upon the designation of the beneficiary, and that
this is true even where there is a reserved right to change the bene-
ficiary.'45 The same result was reached where the policy, made
out to the insured's estate, was later assigned to his wife; here
the court stressed the reason that the assignment gave the wife
"an immediate title and right to enjoy the moneys when they
became payable as death losses."'' 41 It has, however, been held
in a New Jersey case'47 that, where the insured exercised his power
to change the beneficiary by substituting for his wife a trust com-
pany to receive the proceeds and to pay the income therefrom to
the wife for life with remainders over, the interests acquired by
the wife and the remaindermen were taxable as successions under
141Bullen v. Wisconsin (1910) 143 Wis. 512, 128 N. V. 109, aff'd
(1915) 240 U. S. 625, 36 Sup. Ct. 473, 60 L. Ed. 830.
142Smith v. State, (1919) 34 Mfd. 473, 107 Atl. 255.
143Downes v. Safe Dep. & Tr. Co., (Md. 1929) 145 At!. 350. The
transfer in this case was, however, held non-taxable because the statute
required the transferor to die "seized and possessed" of the property
as an additional condition to taxability. For another discussion of the
meaning of this requirement see the case cited in footnote 121.
'44In re Flynn's Estate, (1921) 117 Misc. Rep. 90, 190 N. Y. S.
905.
'45Tyler v. Treas. & Rec. Gen., (1917) 226 Mass. 306, 115 N. E. 300.
'"In re Parson's Estate, (1907) 117 App. Div. 321, 102 N. Y. S. 168.
'
47Fagan v. Bugbee, (N. J. Sup. 1928) 143 Atl. 807.
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a transfer intended, etc. The court admitted that the receipt by a
beneficiary, other than the insured's estate, of the proceeds of a
policy would not be subject to an inheritance tax, but held that it
is the nature of the vehicle which conveys the property, not the
character of the property, which determines the taxability of a
transfer. A New York case, in which a policy payable to the in-
sured's estate was assigned to another in trust for the benefit of
the insured's wife and children, held that this involved neither a
transfer intended, etc., nor one by will nor under the laws of intes-
tate succession. It treated the power of revocation reserved by the
insured as in substance merely a right to change the beneficiary
of the policy which right existed under the policy. 148 This de-
cision seems preferable to that in the New Jersey case if it be
admitted that the receipt by a beneficiary of the proceeds of a
policy on the insured's death is not to be taxed. That rule itself
probably accords with what the framers of these inheritance tax
provisions intended; but it cannot be denied that the receipt of
the proceeds involves a shifting of economic benefits occurring
at the time of, and dependent upon, the insured's death, and that
in substance this shift is from the insured to the beneficiary,
although, of course, the value of the insured's economic interest
just before his death, as measured by the policy's cash surrender
value, is certain to be less than the value received by the bene-
ficiary. 149 These insurance cases may be said to represent the
triumph of technical considerations over economic realities, al-
though it cannot be denied that the insured does in these cases
transfer all the interest that he has, except where he retains a
power to change the beneficiary, and that the beneficiary imme-
diately acquires the whole of that interest unconditionally. except
where the power to change the beneficiary is reserved. The ques-
tion is one on which the courts of most of the states have not yet
passed. To what extent they will, if called upon to decide it, fol-
low the few decided cases or the implications of the "shifting of
economic benefits" doctrine cannot, of course, be foretold. Another
problem deserving at least a mention is the taxability of savings
bank trusts established by one person for another. These cases
148In re Voorhees' Estate, (1922) 200 App. Div. 259, 193 N. Y. S.
168. For the treatment of such a case under another provision of the
New York act see, In re Haedrich's Estate, (1929) 134 Misc. Rep. 741,
236 N. Y. S. 395.
149See in this connection the remarks in Chase Nat'l Bk. v. United
States (1928) 278 U. S. 327, 49 Sup. Ct. 126, 73 L. Ed. 405.
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have held that there was no taxable transfer intended, etc., where
the facts showed a completed irrevocable gift during the donor's
lifetime, 5 ' and that there was a taxable transfer where that was
lacking. 1 It should be stated that the cases cited were decided
while the law of New York as to the effect of reserving a power
to revoke was in a somewhat uncertain state. The opinions in
these cases throw practically no light on the problem of what
constitutes deferring possession and enjoyment until the donor's
death. One further matter deserves consideration. A transfer
may make alternative dispositions such that one of them creates
interests the succession to which would not be taxable if it stood
alone while the other creates interests the succession to which
would be taxable if it stood alone. No case has been found dis-
cussing the question whether the mere presence of the latter
disposition would make taxable an actual succession under the
former. It has, however, been said in a case involving such
alternative dispositions in which the actual succession occurred
in accordance with that one under which it would have been
taxable had that stood alone, that the mere fact that the suc-
cession might under the deed have occurred in a manner involv-
ing non-taxability did not make the actual succession non-taxable.
It was stated that the sequence of events is to be viewed in the
order of the actual rather than the possible. - If that be so,
then it would follow that the mere presence of a disposition
under which the succession would be taxable should not make
taxable an actual succession under the alternative disposition under
which it would not have been taxable had it stood alone. It is
practically certain that a court would so decide the question if
presented with it.
(To be Continued)
1501n matter of Reed, (1915) 89 Misc. Rep. 632, 154 N. Y. S. 247;
In re Rudolph, (1915) 92 Misc. Rep. 347, 156 N. Y. S. 825; In re Bren-
nan, (1915) 92 Misc. Rep. 423, 157 N. Y. S. 141.
'
511n re Barbey's Estate, (Surr. Ct. 1908) 114 N. Y. S. 725; lI re
Halligan's Estate, (1913) 82 Misc. Rep. 30, 143 N. Y. S. 670.
152 -%atter of Schmidlapp, (1923) 236 N. Y. 278, 140 N. E. 97.
